No. 82-1608

In the Supreme Court

of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

SOUTH-CENTRAL TIMBER DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
Petitioner,

ESTHER WUNNICKE V.
~~ROBERT LeRESCHE~~, Commissioner of Department of Natural Resources of the State of Alaska, et al., *Respondents,*

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND BRIEF OF PACIFIC RIM TRADE ASSOCIATION AND WASHINGTON CITIZENS FOR WORLD TRADE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

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MOTION OF PACIFIC RIM TRADE ASSOCIATION AND WASHINGTON CITIZENS FOR WORLD TRADE FOR LEAVE TO APPEAR AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Pacific Rim Trade Association and Washington Citizens for World Trade, nonprofit corporations whose members include companies, labor unions and public agencies engaged in or associated with foreign trade in the Pacific Northwest, respectfully move pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Rules of this Court for leave to appear as *Amici Curiae* and to file the attached Brief supporting the Petition for Certiorari of South-Central Timber Development, Inc. The interest of *Amici Curiae* is stated in the attached Brief (*infra*, pp 1-2). Petitioner has consented to the filing of the Brief; Respondent Kenai Lumber Company, Inc. states it is undecided; and the State Respondents have conditioned their consent. This has required *Amici Curiae* to proceed by motion.

Respectfully submitted,

April 20, 1983.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS:

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE PACIFIC RIM TRADE ASSOCIATION AND WASHINGTON CITIZENS FOR WORLD TRADE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici Curiae are nonprofit corporations whose members are engaged in or associated with foreign trade in the Pacific Northwest.[1] Many of their members are in the business of exporting unprocessed logs and other wood products from northwest ports to Japan and other markets in the far east. An important source of such products in western states is publicly-owned timber which is cut and removed under contracts with state and local governments. Foreign trade in these products is large, and could be drastically affected by log export prohibitions imposed by the states to protect local economic interests.

In its *South-Central* decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has announced an unprecedented rule of implied Congressional consent to state burdens on foreign trade, and thereby sustained Alaska's requirement that the "primary manufacture" of logs sold and removed from state lands be performed in Alaska. The result of that decision is to prevent persons in the log export trade from purchasing state timber in Alaska and to eliminate unprocessed logs sold and removed from state lands from the export market.

Other Ninth Circuit states have similar restric-

[1] The membership of each is set forth at 1a-2a infra.

tions on exporting logs removed from state and other nonfederal public lands. The *South-Central* decision, and specifically the court's novel doctrine of implied Congressional consent to local regulation of foreign trade, tends to support the validity of such statutes, which are a serious threat to international trade conducted by members of these trade groups.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. The Alaska regulation is an attempt by a resource-rich state to reserve its raw materials for exploitation by local business interests. Alaska acts as a market regulator, not a proprietor, because the restriction applies only after a sale and restricts the disposition of privately owned logs to third parties. The Alaska regulation constitutes economic protection that is invalid virtually *per se*.

2. The Ninth Circuit's introduction of a broad and unprecedented doctrine of "implied Congressional consent" to sustain Alaska's protectionist scheme weakens the protection of foreign trade under the Commerce Clause and creates harmful uncertainty about the validity of such restraints. The assertion that Congressional consent to an otherwise invalid regulation of foreign or domestic commerce can be found by a process of implication has been repeatedly rejected — twice during the past term — and is particularly harmful and unsettling on a record that shows no more than a consistency between the Alaska

regulation and the regulation of timber harvests on some, but not all federal lands.

3. Congress has repeatedly declared that the free export of natural and manufactured products constitutes our basic national policy, which is inconsistent with a theory of implied consent to log export restrictions. If the Ninth Circuit's doctrine of implied consent is to be recognized, it should be established and defined by this Court.

ARGUMENT

1. The South-Central Case Presents Important Commerce Clause Questions Which This Court Should Review.

This case presents two issues of importance to the nation's foreign trade. First, the Court of Appeals announced a rule of implied Congressional consent allowing states to burden foreign trade, which weakens the protection given it under Article I § 8 of the United States Constitution. If there is such a rule, it is a new and important one that should be announced by this Court, and should not prevail, even in four Ninth Circuit states that have enacted these export barriers, on the basis of an opinion that lacks any reference to supporting authority and fails to consider recent contrary decisions of this Court.

Second, the export restrictions in question are imposed on the resale or other disposition of goods that the state has sold and no longer owns. The Court

should review *South-Central* to determine the application of *White* v. *Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers*, (1983) — U.S. —, 51 L.W. 4211 to the nation's export trade and define the "limits on a state or local government's ability to impose restrictions that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the government transacts business." 51 L.W. at 4213, n 7.

So long as they are unresolved, these questions will create uncertainty about the freedom of the nation's trade, domestic and foreign, from state regulations that protect local economic interests. They urgently require the Court's attention.

2. Statutes in Four Western States Limit the Export of Unprocessed Logs.

The export trade in unprocessed logs removed from nonfederal public lands in the Pacific Northwest faces destructive regulation in four states, and the threat of such regulation in another. The purpose and effect of these restrictions is to reserve the logs for local processors by banning their export in an unprocessed state.

The legislative format varies. Alaska's Administrative Code requires that "primary manufacture" of the logs be performed in Alaska.[2] Statutes in Cali-

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[2] The Alaska regulation is found at Pet. 19a-21a. At the time of this action, round logs underwent "primary manufacture" when they were sawed into "squares" or "cants" 12 inches on a side or less; present regulations reduce the maximum size to eight and three-quarter inches. Pet. 20a.

fornia and Oregon apply directly to foreign trade, by prohibiting the export of unprocessed logs sold and removed from state land, a ban which Oregon enforces with criminal as well as civil penalties. Idaho prohibits the movement of unprocessed logs in either interstate or foreign commerce.[3]

The district court concluded that the requirement of "primary manufacture" in Alaska violates the Commerce Clause by restraining foreign commerce to protect local economic interests. 511 F. Supp. at 143-44. The Court of Appeals did not disagree; however, it found implied Congressional permission for such local restraints in federal policies governing the export of logs from federal lands in Alaska and other parts of the country. 693 F2d at 892-93. That process of implication has no precedent in the decisions of this Court — indeed, the Court of Appeals cited nothing from this or any other court supporting such a rule. As described and applied by the Ninth Circuit, it is not only novel, but broad; it has no top and no bottom, and can be applied, with the most damaging consequences to foreign trade, by courts considering analogous statutes of other states.

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[3] California forbids the sale or resale of state timber to any "primary manufacturer" for use outside the United States unless it has been sawn into 4″ by 12″ dimensions. Cal. (Pub. Res.) Code § 4650.1 (West). Oregon requires logs removed from state or local public land to be "primarily processed in the United States," and it is a misdemeanor to purchase or sell timber from public land for delivery outside the United States in log form. ORS 526.805 - 526.835. Idaho requires logs removed from state lands to be manufactured into lumber or timber products within the state. Idaho Code § 58-403.

3. A Large and Significant Amount of Foreign Trade is Affected by State Laws Limiting Log Exports.

Exports account for 93% of sales of the products of Alaska timber, and virtually all are destined for Japan.[4] In 1980 Japanese purchasers bought 156,000,000 board feet of unprocessed logs from Alaska vendors worth more than $83 million,[5] mostly from Indian tribes that are not subject to export restrictions. Due to the distance and to shipping costs under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 883, there is no interstate market for Alaska wood products, and the principal burden of the State's primary manufacture rule falls on trade with Japan.

Japan is also a large purchaser of unprocessed logs in other major exporting centers in the Ninth Circuit (Oregon, Washington and northern California), accounting for 89% of such sales in 1980.[6] In that year, export purchases of logs to all countries amounted to a little less than $85 million in Alaska, $16 million in northern California, $277 million in Oregon, and — significantly — $1.034 billion in Washington, which does not restrict log exports.[7]

These are large numbers, and the Ninth Circuit's decision in *South-Central* is obviously important to the international trade of these states. Like any other

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[4] Kerr & Wibbenmeyer, *Alaskan Export Policy* at 26, 33 (1979).

[5] F. Ruderman, *Production, Prices, Employment and Trade in Northwest Forest Industries, Second Quarter 1982* at 19 (United States Forest Service, 1982).

[6] Ruderman, supra, at 10, 16.

[7] Ruderman, supra, at 17-19.

decision sustaining the local regulation of commerce, it tests the country's commitment, under the Commerce Clause, to international trade regulated by Congress for national, not local, purposes.

4. Statutes Limiting Log Exports are an Unconstitutional Restriction on Access to a State's Natural Resources.

The Commerce Clause "precludes a State from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access over out-of-state consumers to natural resources located within its borders or to the products derived therefrom." *New England Power Co.* v. *New Hampshire*, (1982) 455 U.S. 331, 332.[8]

There is no doubt at all about the reason for restricting the Icy Cape sale. It was done to reserve the logs for local processors, as a "short-term cushion to the existing industry," [9] after the Alaska House and Senate passed resolutions requesting the Governor to act "to provide local employment as well as building materials for the Alaska market." [10] Such regulations

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[8] See also *Hughes* v. *Oklahoma*, (1979) 441 U.S. 332, 337-38; *Pennsylvania* v. *West Virginia*, (1923) 262 U.S. 553, 599-60; *West* v. *Kansas Natural Gas Co.*, (1911) 221 U.S. 229, 260-61; *Hicklin* v. *Orbeck*, (1978) 437 U.S. 518, 528-533.

In *Reeves Inc.* v. *Stake*, (1980) 447 U.S. 429 the Court pointed out that "[c]ement is not a natural resource, like coal, *timber*, wild game or minerals * * * South Dakota has not sought to limit access to the State's limestone or other materials used to make cement." 447 U.S. at 434, 443-44; emphasis added.

[9] Letter from Governor Jay Hammond to Lionel Drage, August 8, 1980 (Ex H in the District Court).

[10] Exs A and B to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Excerpt of Record in the Court of Appeals at 73).

require "business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere," *Pike* v. *Bruce Church*, (1970) 397 U.S. 137, 145, and are indistinguishable from other restraints on commerce in raw materials that this Court has repeatedly held invalid. *Baldwin* v. *Seelig*, (1935) 294 U.S. 511, 522-24 (local milk reserved for local processors); *Foster-Fountain Packing Co.* v. *Haydel*, supra, (1928) 278 U.S. 1, 10 (locally harvested shrimp reserved for local processors).

5. Log Export Limitations are an Unconstitutional Regulation of the Buyer's Downstream Transactions with Third Parties.

In the district court, Alaska argued that its program is valid under the "proprietary" exception to the Commerce Clause, because the export restriction applies only to logs sold and removed from state lands, and in making such sales the state trades in the open market as a proprietor and, like a private party, can choose its trading partners. *Hughes* v. *Alexandria Scrap Corp.*, (1976) 426 U.S. 794, 809; *Reeves Inc.* v. *Stake*, supra, (1980) 447 U.S. 429, 437, 443.

This, however, does not permit a state, as in this case, to regulate the distribution of products which it has sold and no longer owns. In offering the Icy Cape timber for sale, Alaska's proposed contract stipulated that the timber would be cut and the logs scaled in the forest; payment would be due the following month. Ownership would pass when the timber was "paid for, cut and scaled" (Ex D in

the District Court, §§ 11, 49). That done, the logs are the buyer's property, and Alaska is not a party to or concerned with their resale. However, the requirement of "primary manufacture" within Alaska prohibits their resale for export solely to protect Alaska's processors.

In *White* v. *Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers*, supra, (1983) — U.S. —, 51 L.W. 4211 the Court sustained, as a proprietary act, a municipal regulation requiring public contractors to reserve a proportion of jobs under city contracts for local unemployed workers. It did so over the objection that the rule affected contracts between the contractors and their employees. The Court recognized, however, that there are "limits" to restrictions that reach beyond the immediate parties to the state's own contract. The city had not transgressed those limits, because it had such control over the work as to be a virtual employer of the construction workers.

A regulation, like Alaska's log export ban, that forbids the export of raw materials after the state has sold them, raises different constitutional considerations: First, this Court has recently reaffirmed the principle that

> "[a] State is without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the people of the State." *Philadelphia* v. *New Jersey*, (1978) 437 U.S. 617

at 627, quoting from *Foster-Fountain Packing Co.* v. *Haydel*, (1928) 278 U.S. 1, 10.

Second, the State of Alaska is not, "in a substantial sense" or otherwise, an "employer" of the buyers or their Japanese customers, and has no interest, as owner or contractor, in regulating the subsequent sale of the logs. This is a case, pure and simple, of downstream regulation to protect local interests. The Alaska regulation excludes from the foreign market unprocessed logs that the state has sold and been paid for, in order to supply the needs of local mills. Such regulation is "a 'protectionist measure' subject to the rule of virtual *per se* invalidity established by many of this Court's cases." *White* v. *Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers*, supra, (1983) — U.S. —, 51 L.W. 4211, 4216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

6. The Process of Implication Announced by the Court of Appeals is a Dangerous and Incorrect Construction of This Court's Decisions.

State restrictions on foreign commerce are subject to "more extensive constitutional inquiry" than restraints on domestic commerce. *Japan Line Ltd* v. *County of Los Angeles*, (1974) 441 U.S. 434, 446. The Court of Appeals did not make that inquiry. Instead, it found "implied" Congressional approval of the Alaska program in federal legislation and administrative rules establishing policies for administering federal, not state, lands. Such "implied" authority has never been a source of consent for state burdens limiting commerce and the contention that it is was re-

jected twice in the last Term, in cases the Court of Appeals did not even cite. *New England Power Co.* v. *New Hampshire*, supra, (1982) 455 U.S. 331; *Sporhase* v. *Nebraska ex rel Douglas*, (1982) — U.S. —, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1254.[11]

Congressional permission to the states to burden commerce cannot be implied, but must be explicit. Mere consistency between federal policy governing federal activities and restraints imposed by the state does not show that Congress has authorized state regulation of commerce; indeed, "coincidence is as fatal as conflict." *Hood* v. *DuMond*, (1949) 336 U.S. 525, 543. This is so not because a process of implication is tainted; it is necessary because protectionist state legislation is a continuing problem — as the reports of each Term of this Court's work demonstrate — that threatens basic constitutional arrangements. The necessary protection of domestic and foreign commerce from restrictive state legislation requires a high degree of compliance with controlling constitutional standards.

This requirement of explicitness must be even more exacting when a state attempts to restrict foreign commerce, which is "inherently national [in]

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[11] In *White* v. *Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers*, supra, (1983) 51 L.W. 4211 the city's authority to burden the interstate labor market with "local hire" rules was, as to federally funded projects, "specifically authorized by Congress," and the Court identified federal regulations that required the city to reserve jobs for local unemployed workers. 51 L.W. at 4213-14.

character." [12] Such regulation intrudes into the field of foreign affairs, and is forbidden whether or not it is consistent with American foreign policy. *Zschernig* v. *Miller*, (1968) 389 U.S. 429, 434-35, 441.

7. Federal Legislation Supporting Export Trade Forecloses Any Implication of Congressional Authorization to Destroy Foreign Trade by Restricting Log Exports.

If there were a principle of implied Congressional consent, none can be found in this case; the Court of Appeals' decision is contradicted by a national policy, embodied in Acts of Congress, which vigorously supports the nation's export trade in natural and manufactured products and affirmatively disapproves local restraints upon it.

First, the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1978, establishes "reciprocal nondiscrimination" as this country's policy to be followed with "major industrial" trading partners, including Japan. 19 U.S.C. § 2136. In "a unique Constitutional experiment" [13] involving the "largest delegation of trade negotiating authority to the Executive in history," [14] the President is authorized to "take all appropriate and feasible steps" to "harmonize, reduce or eliminate" nontariff trade barriers. 19 U.S.C. § 2112.

Second, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 93

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[12] Tribe, *American Constitutional Law*, § 4-5 at 172, § 6-20 at 369-70 (1978). See also *United States* v. *Pink*, (1942) 315 U.S. 203, 233; *Hines* v. *Davidowitz*, (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 68; *United States* v. *Belmont*, (1937) 301 U.S. 324, 331.

[13] S. Rep. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 391 (1979).

[14] S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7196 (1974).

Stat. 144, prohibits states, federal agencies and private persons from engaging in "standards-related activity" [15] that "create[s] unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States." 19 U.S.C. § 2532, 2533.

Third, the Export Administration Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 503, declares that it is the "policy of the United States" to encourage foreign exports, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401(3), 2402(1), particularly exports of agricultural commodities and products, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(11), unless such exports will significantly impair our national security. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2402(2)(A). Agricultural exports can only be restricted if the Secretary of Agricultural approves, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(G)(1),[16] except where the President imposes export controls

> "* * * to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations." 50 U.S.C. app § 2405(a).

The applicable policy of the United States concerning export trade is found in these statutes, not in administrative policies that regulate federal lands, and is

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[15] 19 U.S.C. § 2571(13) defines "standards" to include "(A) The specifications of the characteristics of a product, including * * * dimensions."

[16] The Act forbids the export of Alaskan crude oil, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(d), and western red cedar, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(i). An uncodified appropriation rider has exempted the State of Alaska from the red cedar restriction since November 1979. P.L. 96-126, Title III § 308, Nov. 27, 1979, 93 Stat. 980.

inconsistent with the Alaska requirement of "primary manufacture."

Federal policies referred to by the Court of Appeals do not support its decision. The principal one is in a forest service regulation forbidding the export of round logs from forest service land in Alaska without the Regional Foresters' permission. 36 C.F.R. 223.10 (c). However, the attached policy statement states that the regulation is intended to apply only if it will not prevent the full utilization of the timber and will facilitate a sustained yield program. That harvest policy does not fit this case. Respondents admittedly imposed the ban on the Icy Cape sale to protect employment at local mills, and Alaska has admitted that conditions at Icy Cape do not permit a sustained yield harvest. Answer, ¶ 22.

Similarly, federal statutes do not support an inference of Congressional consent for states to prohibit the export of unprocessed logs from nonfederal public lands. They show only diverse, *ad hoc* policies for various federal timber holdings, and no policy at all for state and private lands.[17]

a. The Organic Act of June 4, 1897 authorizes the

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[17] A staff report published January 6, 1983 by the Joint Legislative Committee on Trade and Economic Development of the Oregon Legislature expresses concern and confusion over the *South-Central* decision. It points out that a doctrine of "implicit congressional approval" has never been enunciated by this Court, and suggests that a court "could as easily find that Congress has repeatedly decided *not* to restrict the export of logs from timber on *non-federal owned lands.*" *Final Draft The Log Export Issue: An Analysis*, at 23; emphasis in the original.

(Footnote continued)

Forest Service to sell national forest timber for use "* * * in the state or territory in which such timber reservation may be situated * * * but not for export therefrom." 16 U.S.C. § 476. However, every annual appropriation act from 1917 through 1926 authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to permit exports, 16 U.S.C. § 491, and the Act of April 12, 1926, 44 Stat. 242, provided permanent authority to export logs from national forests and the Territory of Alaska if "the supply of timber for local use will not be endangered thereby." 16 U.S.C. § 616. On January 26, 1928 the Secretary amended Regulation S-2 by prohibiting the export of logs from Forest Service lands from the territory of Alaska without the Forester's permission. The amended regulation is substantially identical to 36 C.F.R. § 223.10(c), which replaced it.

b. A 1968 statute, 16 U.S.C. § 617, established an export quota for logs from federal lands west of the 100th meridian. From 1969 through 1971 it allowed the export of 350 million board feet per year, except for species and amounts determined to be surplus. That quota was extended for two years by PL. 91-609, but expired in 1973, when it was replaced by a series of annual riders to appropriation acts which prohibit

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(Footnote continued)

This conclusion is also supported by Congress' refusal to enact a nationwide log export ban. See S. 1033, 1507, 1775 and 1820, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The leading bill, S. 1033, did not come to a vote after President Nixon concluded an agreement on May 14, 1973 with the Japanese government to limit exports to that country. S. Rep. No. 93-198, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., *"Softwood Log and Lumber Export Restrictions,"* 6, 10-12 (1973).

the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture from using appropriated funds to export timber from federal lands west of the 100th meridian in the contiguous 48 states. See, e.g., PL. 96-126 § 301, 93 Stat. 979, which was in effect when this action was filed.

The Forest Service thus has not one, but three log export policies, all limited to federal timber: one for Alaska under the 1926 Act; a second for lands in states west of the 100th meridian under the Appropriation Act; and a third — free export — for national forest timber east of the 100th meridian.

c. The export policy of the Bureau of Land Management is generally consistent with the Forest Service policy applicable to lands west of the 100th meridian. 16 U.S.C. § 615a; 43 C.F.R. 5400.0-3(c) and (d). However, nearly all of the Bureau's lands in Alaska were conveyed to Native Americans under the Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1621(k) (l), which contained a temporary restriction on log exports that expired in 1976. Logs from Native American lands in Alaska are freely exportable, and in 1981 149 million board feet were exported.[18]

d. Logs from land administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs can also be exported, except logs removed from 61,000 acres near the Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon, which is subject to an export restriction that will expire in 1992. 86 Stat. 719.

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[18] Staff Report, note 15, supra.

e. The only federal statute directly affecting non-federal timber is the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401, et seq, 93 Stat. 503, which bans the export of unprocessed western red cedar. Since November 27, 1979 Alaska has been exempt from that restriction. PL. 96-126, Title III, § 308, 93 Stat. 980.

This welter of conflicting statutes and regulations does not establish a congressional log export "policy" for federal lands, much less for state or other public lands, and certainly does not constitute Congressional "permission" for states to limit log exports. The willingness of the Court of Appeals to rely on such materials shows the risk to foreign trade that *South-Central* presents. This Court should review the principle of implication announced by that Court and either reject it or establish effective limits to avoid weakening important national objectives of the Commerce Clause.

CONCLUSION

Alaska's interference with log exports is part of a larger problem in the western states that threatens foreign trade in privately owned logs after their sale and removal from public lands. Such destructive regulation is easily transferable to other states that may wish to reserve natural resources for their own citizens. *Amici Curiae* respectfully urge the Court to grant the Petition and issue the Writ.

Respectfully submitted

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April 20, 1983.

APPENDIX

LIST OF MEMBERS OF
PACIFIC RIM TRADE ASSOCIATION
AND
WASHINGTON CITIZENS FOR WORLD TRADE

Pacific Rim Trade Association

Atlas Steamship Co., Northwest
Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co.
Brusco Tow Boat Co.
Burlington Northern, Inc.
Caffal Bros. Forest Products, Inc.
Cascade Shipping Co.
Central Dock Co.
Columbia River Bar Pilots
Coos Bay Ship Pilots
Crown Zellerbach Corporation
Dant & Russel, Inc.
Dillingham Ship Repair
Dolphin Terminals
East Orient Timber Co.
Eureka Forest Products
Fibrex & Shipping Co., Inc.
General Steamship Corp., Ltd.
International Log Sales/ Bald Knob Land & Timber
International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union
International Shipping Co.
Jones Oregon Stevedoring Company
Knappton Corporation
Knutson Towboat Co./ Log Storage
Koontz Machine & Welding, Inc.

Washington Citizens for World Trade

Allman Hubble Tug Boat Company
Anderson & Middleton Lumber
ASARCO
Norman Barnes & Co.
Burlington Northern, Inc.
Crown Zellerbach Corporation
Evans Engine & Equipment
Howard-Cooper Corporation
John Hoyne
International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union
ITT Rayonier, Inc.
Jones Washington Stevedoring
Mayr Brothers Logging
Murray Pacific
Pacific Lumber & Shipping
Port of Anacortes
Port of Bellingham
Port of Everett
Port of Grays Harbor
Port of Longview
Port of Olympia
Port of Port Angeles
Port of Tacoma
E. R. Probyn
Roderick Timber Company
St. Regis Paper
Scott Paper
Seattle Stevedore Company
Washington Contract Loggers Association

Pacific Rim Trade Association
(Continued)

Longview Fibre Company
Niedermeyer-Martin Co.
North Bend Fabrication & Machine Inc.
Olympic Steamship Co., Inc.
Oregon Small Woodlands Association
Al Pierce Lumber Co.
Port of Astoria
Port of Coos Bay
Port of Portland
Riedel International, Inc.
Shaver Transportation Co.
United States Trading Company, Inc.
Van Natta Brothers
Westbrook Exports (Reservation Ranch)
Western Equipment Co. of Eugene
Western Transportation Co.
Westfall Stevedore Co.
Weyerhaeuser Company
Williams, Diamond & Co.

Washington Citizens for World Trade
(Continued)

Washington Farm Forestry Asssociation
Washington Public Ports Association
Washington Trucking Association
Weyerhaeuser Company